From Local to Global Competition by Simon P. Anderson & Andre de Palma




Andr¶ e de Palma
THEMA,
Universit¶ e de Cergy-Pontoise
November 1997, revised May 1998
JEL Classi¯cation: D43, L13
KEYWORDS: Product Di®erentiation, Economic Geography, Spatial Competition, Localization,
Monopolistic Competition.
ABSTRACT
We introduce a framework that has known models of oligopolistic competition with di®erentiated prod-
ucts (the circle, the logit, and the CES) as limit cases. This integrative approach incorporates both localized
and global competition, as well as price-sensitive individual demands. It is used to explain the impact of ma-
jor changes over the last two centuries: reductions in transport costs, increased taste for variety, population
growth, and use of technologies with greater returns to scale. We work out the properties of an extended
Chamberlinian model with applications both in Industrial Organization and Economic Geography.
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The changes in the structure of retailing in towns, and industrial structure in general, have been
enormous over the last two centuries. Much of what has happened can be ascribed to changes
in economic fundamentals, including technological changes, transport improvements, population
growth, and changes in tastes. When economists want to think about explaining the changes in
industrial structure and retailing, it is natural to turn to oligopoly theory. Within the existing
theory, there are two basic choices for models of oligopoly with price competition. These are the
spatial model such as the circle model developed by Vickrey (1964) and elaborated by Salop (1979);
and the (aspatial) representative consumer model such as the CES model used by Spence (1976)
and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), which is the workhorse in much of the work by Krugman in economic
geography and trade (for example, Krugman, 1995; see also Grossman and Helpman, 1991).
These approaches are very di®erent. Spatial models such as the circle model or the Hotelling
(1929) model are useful because they admit an explicit role for space and generate market demands
by explicitly integrating over consumers with di®erent tastes. But the standard location model
assumes consumers buy one unit of the product, and that goods sold by ¯rms are perfectly ho-
mogenous so that consumers go to the nearest store (in equilibrium) to buy their unit. This is a
rather simplistic description of individual demand and individual travel behavior. The CES repre-
sentative consumer model starts directly with market demand. It allows aggregate demand to vary
with the price level, but this demand is unitary elastic. The model admits (nonspatial) product
di®erentiation, but has the strong symmetry property that a price cut draws demand equally from
all other ¯rms. Moreover, the ratio of any two demands is independent of the prices of all the
other products. Under the CES formulation, each ¯rm competes equally with all others (compe-
1tition is global): by contrast, the circle model has each ¯rm directly competing with only its two
immediate neighbors (competition is localized). In this paper we propose a method that integrates
these two approaches and retains the desirable features of each. Thus we allow the structure of
competition to vary between the two extremes, while the price elasticity of aggregate demand is
allowed to vary between zero or unity. Aggregate demand is generated from explicit aggregation
of heterogeneous individuals. The resulting framework is more than the sum of its parts insofar
as there are interactions that one would not expect from just thinking about the properties of the
ingredient models.
We apply the model to study the changes described in the ¯rst paragraph. For many cases the
comparative static results are simple and intuitive, and we eschew formal algebraic proofs of these
in favor of verbal arguments that follow from the model. This also highlights the robustness of
the results, and stresses properties common to models of oligopolistic competition. Other results
are more intricate and depend on parameter values. For example, an increase in consumer taste
for variety (or choosiness) can reduce the market equilibrium price if taste for variety is low, but
increases it otherwise. The latter result is standard in models of product di®erentiation and stems
from greater market power. The former result is an explicitly spatial phenomenon arising from
the joint consideration of taste for variety along with spatial di®erentiation. The intuition is that
a higher taste for variety breaks down the localization of competition in the spatial market and
brings ¯rms into market contact with other ¯rms beyond their nearest neighbors. The consequent
higher degree of contact engenders more competition for consumers farther away, and thence lower
prices.
Another variable of interest, and which is special to our setting, is the degree of e®ective variety
available to consumers. Large e®ective variety means that many di®erentiated products are easily
2accessible. The degree e®ective variety also provides an index of the degree of globalization of
competition. An index close to zero means consumers mainly buy from the closest ¯rm; an index
close to one means consumers shop around. In a comparison of two cities with the same population
density, we show that the larger one will have a lower e®ective variety (even though it has more
¯rms) because price competition among ¯rms keeps their numbers from rising proportionally with
size. This e®ect is overturned if the population density in the larger city is su±ciently large, so
there can indeed be more e®ective choice in Geneva than in Charlottesville. The model we present
is highly stylized and liberally uses symmetry assumptions. It is intended to provide a very broad
sketch of major forces that determine industry structure. By emphasizing both space and taste
for variety, it contributes to the so-called New Economic Geography (see Krugman, 1991). We
hope that the model will form a basis for future empirical studies. Recent work on the automobile
market by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995), and Koujianou
Goldberg (1995) has proved very successful in applying models that integrate the supply side with
discrete choice models of product di®erentiation. Similar research could also greatly enhance our
understanding of spatial interaction in the retail sector.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out a general model of oligopolistic com-
petition with product di®erentiation and Section 3 describes the structure of preferences that gives
rise to the integrative model of spatial and product di®erentiation. Section 4 ¯nds the equilibrium
price and pro¯t, while Section 5 treats free entry and exit. The e®ects of a reduction in transport
costs and of an increased preference for diversity are covered in Sections 6 and 7, respectively.
Sections 8 and 9 do likewise for population growth and changes in cost structures. Section 10 con-
cludes. The reader who is interested in the economic predictions rather than the technical details
of the model may wish to skip the next four sections and move directly to the comparative static
3sections, 6 through 9. The comparative static results are summarized in Table 1 in the conclusions.
2. PRELIMINARIES
There are n ¯rms, and each produces a single variety of a di®erentiated product.1 There is a
population of consumers of mass N, and each consumer buys from only one of the n ¯rms (but the
amount bought depends on the price charged). A consumer of type j is characterized by a vector of
continuously distributed match values, ²ij, where i = 1:::n is the ¯rm label. These match values are
instrumental in describing the utility match between consumers and ¯rms. The (indirect) utility
for a consumer of type j conditional on buying from ¯rm i is:
Vij = Yj + v(pi) + ²ij; i = 1:::n; (1)
where Yj is consumer j's income and v(pi) is her consumer surplus (net of the match value) if ¯rm
i's product is bought at price pi. Consumer j chooses the ¯rm for which Vij is largest (we assume







so that conditional demand is (using Roy's identity)
x(pi) = ¡v0(pi) = p
¡®
i (3)
1The one-product-per-¯rm assumption, while standard in most oligopoly analysis, is often empirically invalid. In
the geographical context (health-food stores or antique shops), the assumption is perhaps less jarring than in the
pure characteristics interpretation of the model (breakfast cereals, soap powders, or cars). Anderson, de Palma, and
Thisse (1992) show how the logit limit case can be extended to an analytically tractable treatment of multiproduct
¯rms, which provides some hope for extension of the current model.
4where ® = ¡x0(pi)pi=x(pi) 2 [0;1) is the elasticity of conditional demand.2 When ® = 0, each
consumer buys one unit from her most preferred ¯rm, while ® ! 1 corresponds to spending a
constant amount from that ¯rm.
Assume that ¯rm i charges pi and all other ¯rms charge p¤. The market share of ¯rm i is
the fraction of consumers for whom i = argmax
k=1¢¢¢n
[v(pk) + ²kj] and is denoted by Si(pi;p¤), with
S(p¤;p¤) = 1=n. In case of ties, consumers are shared equally among ¯rms that they like best. For
the moment, let marginal cost be zero (this assumption is relaxed in Section 9). Letting K denote
¯xed costs, each ¯rm's pro¯t is
¦i = Npix(pi)Si(pi;p¤) ¡ K; i = 1:::n: (4)
From the ¯rst-order condition with respect to pi, using (3) and setting pi = p¤; the candidate







where S0 > 0 denotes
±Si(pi;p¤)
±v(pi) (the market share derivative with respect to conditional consumer
surplus) evaluated at pi = p¤. The equilibrium pro¯t per ¯rm is
¦¤(n) =
N(1 ¡ ®)
n2S0 ¡ K: (6)
All relevant magnitudes are therefore determined by S0, which therefore provides a clean summary
2The assumption that elasticity is constant can be relaxed, but the resulting price equilibrium expressions no
longer have reduced forms.
5statistic enabling the comparison of di®erent symmetric oligopoly models including those commonly
considered in the literature as well as new forms. This statistic is determined by the speci¯cation
of the match values introduced in (1).
3. MATCH VALUES
We wish to capture the idea that consumers buy the product that suits them best in terms of
geographical location distance and product speci¯cation. If transport costs are high and products
do not di®er much, a consumer will not go to the other side of town even though she has a
slight preference for the product sold there. If transport costs are low and products are greatly
di®erentiated, someone will readily travel far to get a good product match (e.g. take the subway
to get sushi). In the ¯rst case competition is essentially local, while in the second it is essentially
global. We assume that the total match value of a consumer with a ¯rm is a weighted sum of the
geographic match and the speci¯c product match. Varying the relative weights on these matches
generates di®erent degrees of localization of competition.
The geographic match is generated from the circle model with linear transport costs.3 Con-
sumers are uniformly distributed around a circle of circumference L, so the consumer density is
N=L. Products are equally spaced and located L=n apart.4 A consumer at location zj travels
a distance jzj ¡ zij if she buys from a ¯rm at location zi (she takes the shorter way around the
circle). Letting the transport cost rate be t, the geographic matches for consumer j are ¡tjzj ¡zij,
3Other speci¯cations of the transport cost function are also possible, but linear seems the most natural. We could
parameterize the transport cost function, but we would not wish to burden the analysis with further parameters that
we think would have little e®ect. More importantly, we cannot integrate the demand functions for other transport
cost speci¯cations, so we can only get a closed form price equilibrium for linear transport costs. We should note
though that quadratic transport costs would give us equilibrium existence directly from Caplin and Nalebu® (1991).
4Ideally, we should also prove that symmetric locations constitute an equilibrium in an extended model with
endogenous locations. For the present model this is a daunting task. Simpler models have such symmetric equilibria
(e.g. Economides, 1989).
6i = 1:::n:
In standard location models, each ¯rm competes directly with only two neighbors, and markets
are strictly delineated in the geographic space. When all ¯rms charge the same price, each consumer
goes to the closest ¯rm since all products are homogeneous (apart from their locations). If though
products are di®erentiated, a consumer might buy from a more distant ¯rm if it better suits her
tastes. Market boundaries blur, and consumers at the same geographical location may purchase
from di®erent ¯rms. From a ¯rm's perspective, there is then a positive probability that a consumer
at any given location will buy from it. In the limit as transport costs tend to zero, this probability
tends to 1=n if all ¯rms charge the same price.
We wish to construct a demand system that reduces to a completely symmetric one (a la
Chamberlin) at the limit t ! 0. We therefore suppose that the product match values for a consumer
j chosen at random from the population are i:i:d. across products. This implies that if all products
carried the same price, a new entrant would capture customers equally from all existing ¯rms.
Similarly, a price cut by one ¯rm would draw consumers equally from all other ¯rms. We shall
further concentrate on a speci¯c distribution of consumer tastes, the double exponential, which
gives rise to the logit speci¯cation for the product selection percentages. The logit is the only
form that has the additional symmetry property that the ratio of choice percentages for any two
products is independent of the price - or even the existence - of any third product. This is known
in the literature as the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property, which implies that
a new entrant or a product price reduction will take customers from other products in proportion
to the original choice percentages.
Now consider how the demand structure of the circle model changes when we append the logit
to it. It may help here to think of restaurants, so that one source of di®erentiation is geographical,
7and this is a source of localization of competition. Ceteris paribus, localized di®erentiation is more
important the greater the transport rate, t. On the other hand, each restaurant provides a di®erent
menu, di®erent ambience, decoration, and style. For this second source of di®erentiation, the i:i:d.
assumption means that knowing a consumer's preferred restaurant style tells us nothing about
her next preferred restaurant style, etc. Furthermore, under the logit speci¯cation, the relative
percentages of consumers visiting the ¯sh and chip shop over the pizza parlor are independent of
the price at the burger joint. The intensity of this taste component is measured by the parameter ¹,
which is proportional to the standard deviation of the taste density function. Global di®erentiation
is more important, ceteris paribus, the greater is ¹:
We treat geographic and product matches as independent factors in tastes. As in econometric
models, we sum the two match types. Hence we write the total ¯rm match as:
²ij = ¡tjzj ¡ zij + ¹eij;i = 1:::n: (7)
Each consumer type is described by a position zj on the circle as well as a vector of product speci¯c
match values eij that are double exponentially distributed.5 The model is consistent with either
intrinsic consumer preferences (each consumer draws her product match values once and for all,
and always buys from the same ¯rm), or else °uctuating preferences (a new set of product match
values is drawn each shopping trip, so the consumer tends to buy from di®erent ¯rms).
The probability that a consumer located at zj buys from ¯rm i is Pi(zj) = Prob(Vij ¸ Vkj,
k = 1:::n). Using (1) and (7) with the double exponential distribution leads to the logit speci¯cation
5The corresponding density of types is (N=L)
n Q
i=1
f(ei), with f(ei) = exp[¡ei]exp[¡exp(ei)]:
8for any z so:
Pi(z) =
exp[(v(pi) ¡tjz ¡ zij)=¹]
n P
k=1
exp[(v(pk) ¡ tjz ¡ zkj)=¹]
;i = 1:::n: (8)
In this setting, ¹ represents the weight given to product matches, and t the weight on distance.
For t > 0, and ¹ ! 0, each ¯rm is in competition with only its two neighbors in geographic space
(pure local di®erentiation). As ¹ rises from zero, ¯rms start to attract consumers from beyond
their neighbors, and so come into contact with ¯rms farther away. However, direct competition
with other ¯rms is lower the farther away they are (farther down the chain). Spatial di®erentiation
is less important the higher is ¹=t, with more overlapping along the chain of ¯rms. When ¹=t
is large enough, the spatial chain aspect essentially disappears, and all products become equally
good substitutes (pure global di®erentiation). If both ¹ and t go to zero, then all products become
perfectly homogenous and price goes to marginal cost (the standard Bertrand result). Note though
that ¹ and t enter the choice probability function (8) in di®erent ways: in particular, higher ¹
decreases price sensitivity as well as distance sensitivity whereas lower t only reduces distance
sensitivity. These di®erential e®ects lead to qualitatively di®erent comparative static e®ects for
these two variables, as we shall see in the sections below.
We measure the e®ective product variety available to consumers by Á = exp(¡ tL
n¹). This index
is zero if products are completely undi®erentiated (¹ = 0); for t > 0; Á = 0 corresponds to pure
localized competition. The index rises with n (more choice) and with ¹ (more intrinsic preference
for variety), and falls with tL (more spatial friction). When products are very di®erentiated or when
the transport rate is very small, each ¯rm competes symmetrically with all others and competition
is purely global. In this case Á = 1. Hence Á provides a measure of the degree of global competition
in the market.
9The formulation (8) was ¯rst proposed by de Palma et al. (1985) and was there applied to
¯rm location in a linear segment; later developments are described in Anderson et al. (1992, Ch
9). This earlier work treats º (pi) = ¡pi, so that each consumer buys one unit of the good. Much
more importantly, the earlier work is either an explicit duopoly analysis, or else essentially duopoly
in that agglomeration equilibria are derived by showing that one ¯rm does not wish to deviate
from the midpoint location occupied by the remaining (n ¡ 1) ¯rms. The present paper analyzes a
full-°edged oligopoly model and, furthermore, allows for an endogenous number of ¯rms.
4. MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
We can now derive the equilibrium price for the oligopoly model. Assume there is an even number
of ¯rms and let the number of pairs of ¯rms be m ¸ 1.6 From the expression for the symmetric
price equilibrium (5), we must derive the market share derivative S0, evaluated at a symmetric
solution.
The market share expression is given by Si = 2
L
R L=2
0 Pi(z)dz, where Pi(z) is given by (8).7






^ Pi(z)(1 ¡ ^ Pi(z))dz (9)
where (using (8)),




To evaluate S0 we must ¯rst rewrite ^ Pi(z): without loss of generality, we may consider ¯rm 0,
6The analysis that follows can be reformulated for an odd number of ¯rms, but there are no qualitative changes.
7For t > 0, market share Si and ¯rm demand x(pi)Si are no longer constrained by the IIA property discussed in
the previous section (in contrast to the standard logit and CES models).
10located at 12 o'clock. Let - ´ L=2m (the inter¯rm distance - there are 2m ¯rms) and recall that
Á ´ exp(¡t-=¹) 2 (0;1). Let z 2 (k-;(k + 1)-), for some k = 0:::m ¡ 1. Any consumer at z
patronizing a ¯rm l = k + 1:::k + m will \travel" clockwise to get there, so jz ¡ z`j = (` - ¡ z)
for such ¯rms. Travel to the remaining ¯rms is counter-clockwise, involving distances z ¡ ` - for
` = 1:::k and z + (2m ¡ `)- for ¯rms l = k +m + 1:::2m. After summation,
^ P0(z) = f³[Ák exp[
2tz
¹
] + Á¡(k+1)]g¡1; (11)


































0 ^ P0(z)dz = -
2 (by symmetry, ¯rms share the market equally), so the required
expression is S0 = 1=(nÃ(n)), where
Ã(n) =
¹(1 ¡ Ám)(1 + Á)2 ln Á
2(Á ¡ Ám)(1 + Á)ln Á ¡ (1 + Ám)(1 ¡ Á)2; (14)
and we recall n = 2m. Therefore, the candidate symmetric equilibrium price given by (5) has the
explicit form
p¤ = [(1 ¡ ®)Ã(n)]
1=(1¡®) ; (15)





Proving that (15) is indeed an equilibrium is not a simple matter. Standard existence tech-
niques require showing either that pro¯ts are quasiconcave or that the game is supermodular. The
oligopoly game here is not supermodular, nor are pro¯ts always quasiconcave.8 There are important
cases when they are quasiconcave, however, and then existence is ensured.
First, for duopoly (m = 1), the results of Caplin and Nalebu® (1991) can be applied: the pro¯t
function is always quasiconcave and existence is ensured. Second, if ¹ is small enough, the fact that
the pro¯t function and candidate equilibrium price are continuous in ¹ implies that pro¯t remains
quasiconcave because it is strictly concave when ¹ = 0 (see Anderson and de Palma, 1995, p.38, for
a more formal argument and Appendix 1 for a proof that pro¯t is concave - and so equilibrium exists
- for the circle model with price-sensitive demand). Hence p¤ as given by (15) is an equilibrium for
¹ small enough.
Third, for ¹ large enough, we can also show analytically that pro¯t is quasiconcave. The
argument has some intrinsic interest and is given in Appendix 2, where we show that pro¯t is
quasiconcave (and equilibrium exists) for Á = exp(¡t-=¹) ¸ 1=3 (or, equivalently, tL=m¹ · 1:1).
8Milgrom and Roberts (1990) prove existence by showing that the logarithm of pro¯t for the logit model has the
desired property, that marginal pro¯t increases with rivals' prices, so reaction functions can only jump up. This
method will not work here. (Since demand is the integral over space of logit demands, taking logarithms or other
transformations does not simplify matters.) Indeed, for small ¹ the reaction function exhibits downward jumps, and
so the game cannot be supermodular. To see this, consider the circle model (¹ = 0) with price-sensitive demands.
If the common price of the rivals is high enough, the best reply is to price undercut. This example also shows
that the pro¯t functions are not generally quasiconcave for arbitrary levels of the rivals' prices. However, at the
candidate equilibrium price (t=Ln for the circle model where ¹ = 0) pro¯t is actually concave where positive because
undercutting entails a zero price (see Appendix 1). This means that it is not possible to get a general quasiconcavity
result simply because pro¯t is not quasiconcave for all levels of rivals' price.
12The structure of this proof is to ¯rst consider the pro¯t of ¯rm 0 at a point z as a function of
p0. This point-pro¯t is concave up to a critical price pI
0(z) which exceeds the price that maximizes
the point-pro¯t, and pro¯t is falling beyond pI
0(z). When di®erentiation is relatively global, the
point-pro¯t functions are relatively \close" to each other, so that the one that has the greatest
maximizing price (i:e:, for z = 0) is decreasing for prices such that the one for which pI
0(z) is
smallest (i:e:, for z = L=2) is still concave (see Figure 3 in Appendix 2). Hence the total pro¯t
function is concave and then decreasing, and so is quasiconcave. The proof ¯nds the critical value
(the critical \closeness") as Á = 1=3 or ¹ t 0:9tL=m.9
We have run several numerical computations of the behavior of the pro¯t function for values
of ¹ that the analytic arguments do not cover. In all cases, the pro¯t functions are embarrassingly
quasiconcave (although very complicated when explicitly integrated). A typical example is given
in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Behavior of pro¯t function, n = 4; t = 1; ® = 0; and ¹ = 0:08293:
To sum up, the existence issue revolves around showing that the candidate price as given by (15)
cannot be improved upon by unilateral deviations. For duopoly, pro¯t functions are quasiconcave
for all possible prices so (15) then constitutes an equilibrium. For more than two ¯rms, (15)
describes an equilibrium if ¹ is either small enough or else above a critical value that nevertheless
still corresponds to a fairly localized degree of competition (and equilibrium exists for all higher
degrees of global competition). The proof of the latter property constitutes a contribution to
9To get an idea of the extent of localization consistent with the bound Á = 1=3 given from the existence proof, recall
that under pure local di®erentiation (¹ = 0), all consumers in the interval [0;-=2] buy only from ¯rm 0. For Á = 1=3














, which approaches .37
as m gets large. One way to think of this number is that the consumers closest to a restaurant buy from it over one
third of the time. In that sense competition seems quite localized. For higher values of Á, existence is guaranteed,
and the spatial distribution of consumers is more even.
13the literature on equilibrium existence in spatial markets since it exploits the spatial structure
by looking at pro¯t functions at each point in space and then aggregating to prove overall pro¯t
quasiconcavity. For intermediate values of ¹, for which we have no analytic proof, all simulations
indicate that pro¯t functions are quasiconcave (given all other ¯rms set the price (15)), which is
a stronger property than is needed for equilibrium existence. Thus we have no counter-examples
to equilibrium existence, and we conjecture that (15) is indeed an equilibrium for all parameter
values.
The limit cases of the equilibrium price (15) correspond to well-known models. As ¹ ! 0, (14)
reduces to tL=n, the price equilibrium for the standard circle model (when ® = 0). For t ! 0, it
can be shown that (14) converges towards
¹n
n¡1 , which is consistent with the standard aspatial logit
result (see Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse 1992, for the case of ® = 0).10 Finally, if n ! 1, with
L ¯nite, which can be construed as the case of monopolistic competition, from (14) we have Ã = ¹.
(The same limit arises when n ! 1 for the aspatial logit - transport costs become irrelevant when
more and more ¯rms are crowded into a ¯xed product space.)11
5. FREE ENTRY EQUILIBRIUM
The zero-pro¯t equilibrium is that envisaged by Chamberlin, and we shall refer to this as the \long-
run" equilibrium. The associated number of ¯rms is characterized (from (16)) as the solution, n,
10Another interesting limit expression corresponds to an in¯nite line model which has appeared in the spatial
literature (see Eaton and Wooders, 1985) as an alternative method of circumventing boundary problems. The idea
is again to treat equally spaced ¯rms: this is captured by holding L=n constant while letting both L and n tend to
in¯nity. Thus the circumference of the circle becomes arbitrarily large, and, for n ! 1, expression (14) becomes
Ã(n) =
¹(1+Á)2 ln Á
2Á(1+Á) ln Á¡(1¡Á)2 ;which again reduces to tl=¹ as ¹ goes to zero.
11The result that price exceed marginal cost can be ascribed to the behavior of the upper tail of the double
exponential distribution (see Perlo® and Salop, 1985). For other distributions with \thinner" tails (such as the
normal, which leads to the probit model), price converges to marginal cost when n is very large. In our case, a
mark-up is sustained because brands retail loyal consumers whose valuations of their most preferred products are




[(1 ¡ ®)Ã(n)] = K: (17)
The zero-pro¯t characterization can be criticized on two counts. First, because the number of ¯rms
should reasonably be an integer, it is an approximation, although a relatively innocuous one when
the number of ¯rms is large. More importantly, Eaton and Lipsey (1978) argued that pure pro¯ts
can be sustained in free-entry equilibrium because an entrant must ¯t into a gap between existing
¯rms, and thus earn substantially lower revenue than the incumbents. Here we implicitly assume
(as do Salop, 1979, and many other authors) that ¯rms relocate to a symmetric position subsequent
to entry.
To get a better intuition for the comparative statics that follow, it is worth spending some time
discussing how the short-run equilibrium changes with n: As one might expect, the equilibrium
price is decreasing with n: more ¯rms means more competition for consumers. This result is
readily shown by di®erentiating (14) (see Anderson and de Palma, 1995). Revenue per ¯rm falls as
n rises because prices are lower and aggregate demand is inelastic, so a smaller total revenue pie is
shared among more ¯rms. Hence the long run equilibrium is uniquely determined.
The e®ects of an increase in n on output per ¯rm (which we henceforth refer to as ¯rm size) are
more involved. Clearly total output, Np¡®, goes up because price falls, but this is shared among
more ¯rms. It turns out that ¯rm size rises if aggregate demand is su±ciently elastic (® is large






which is proportional to n(2®¡1)=(1¡®). Clearly ¯rm size increases with n if ® > 1=2. If t = 0




and increases with n if ® > 1 ¡ 1=n, which
exceeds 1=2 as long as there are more than two ¯rms. In this sense, ¯rm size is more likely to rise
15when competition is more localized. When competition is global, we just showed that there is a
critical value of n (equal to 1=(1¡®)) such that size increases with the number of ¯rms up to this
value, and decreases beyond it. We should not conclude from this that ¯rm size will rise and then
fall (if the demand structure is su±ciently global) in an industry where the number of ¯rms grows
over time. It is also necessary to explain why the number of ¯rms has changed. For example, an
increase in transport costs, taste for variety, or population, or a decrease in costs could all lead to
more ¯rms in the long run, but changes in these variables also have direct (short run) e®ects on
¯rm size. These issues are addressed in the next four sections.
We have also compared equilibrium and optimum numbers of ¯rms. There is always overentry.
This result is not too surprising (and we do not dwell on it here), since the circle model involves
massive overentry: for ® = 0, the equilibrium number is twice the optimum one, and for t = 0,
the numbers are about equal (but just on the overentry side). As t increases from zero, the
equilibrium and optimum numbers diverge more. Loosely, larger transport costs lead to less e®ective
competition (competition is more localized), and the high prices attract too many ¯rms.12
6. TRANSPORT IMPROVEMENTS
Transport costs have decreased dramatically this century. In the city, there was the development of
mass transit. After 1945 came massive investment in road infrastructure coupled with a spectacular
rise in car ownership. Even earlier, the costs of shipping goods was greatly reduced with the use
of canals and then railways. Technological developments like bottling, canning, and pasteurization
12See Deneckere and Rothschild (1992) for more on the comparison between pure local and pure global competition.
Our model provides a path from one extreme to the other. Anderson, de Palma, and Nesterov (1995) showed that
there is overentry for t = 0 and ® < 1; for all logconcave match distributions (logconcavity being a su±cient condition
for a price equilibrium to exist, as per Caplin and Nalebu®, 1991).
16meant it was possible to ship goods over long distances without spoilage. The consequences for
industry structure have been profound.
In our model, a fall in t induces some consumers to travel farther to ¯nd a better product match
(this does not happen in the standard circle model). It also means that a rival's customer is easier
to sway with a price cut. Both e®ects create more e®ective competition, and this reduces prices.13
With lower prices, pro¯ts fall but ¯rm size rises. Hence lower transport costs lead to larger ¯rms
in the short run and exit in the long run. As ¯rms exit the industry, competition is weakened
and prices rise somewhat. They do not rise so much that the exit e®ect o®sets the initial e®ect.
If they did there would be fewer ¯rms selling at higher prices, which is not in accord with the
zero-pro¯t equilibrium. The long-run equilibrium therefore has fewer and larger ¯rms, with lower
prices. Supermarkets tend to replace Mom-and-Pop grocery stores, small local brewers give way to
large multinationals.
The index of e®ective variety, Á = exp(¡tL=¹n), clearly rises in the short run because consumers
can travel more cheaply to ¯nd products they prefer. In the long run, the number of ¯rms falls,
so there is a priori some ambiguity as to the overall e®ect. A su±cient condition for Á to rise is
that Ã does not fall as much as t in percentage terms (it may help for the intuition to recall that
Ã is simply the equilibrium price when ® = 0). To see this, suppose t is halved and Ã falls by
half or less. In the short run, revenues fall by half or less (see (16)). If prices were held ¯xed and
half the ¯rms exited, revenues would return to at least their original level. But prices are not ¯xed
when ¯rms exit, they rise. Thus it must be that fewer than half the ¯rms exit. Accordingly, t=n
falls and Á rises. This argument does not always apply because certain parameter values admit a
13A formal derivation of the result that @Ã=@t > 0 is given in Anderson and de Palma, 1995.
17percentage fall in Ã greater than the percentage fall in t. This only happens for ¹ small.14 Su±ce
it to conclude that the usual case (if not the only case, we have no counter-example) is that, as
expected, e®ective variety rises in the long run when transport costs fall.
7. WHEN CONSUMERS BECOME MORE CHOOSY
Subsequent to the large decrease in transport costs, casual observation suggests that products have
become more di®erentiated over time and consumers are increasingly willing to pay for products
which better ¯t their preferences. What suits one consumer may be anathema to another (e:g.
sushi, tofu, frogs' legs, or horsesteak): products are horizontally di®erentiated. The number of
types of computer software seems to be growing without bound, ethnic restaurants °ourish, and
more and more types of beer are available in bars. Recent advances in Marketing emphasize the
importance of tailoring goods to individual tastes and speci¯c market niches, and technological
advances have made it easy to produce goods which are more di®erentiated. It does not matter
whether products are actually more di®erentiated, whether consumers just perceive them to be
more di®erentiated, or if consumers are just more choosy. All these changes are described in our
model by an increase in the parameter ¹. Note that increases in ¹ are not equivalent to decreases in
t (see (14) and (15) and note the factor ¹ in the numerator of (14) that is not o®set by a t). While
higher ¹ does reduce distance sensitivity, it also reduces price sensitivity, which has important
e®ects on the comparative static result.
The ¯rst (and perhaps most interesting) result is that equilibrium price does not necessarily
rise with ¹. A standard result in the literature on product di®erentiation is that greater product
14Indeed, simulations indicate that this can happen only around the \dip" in the equilibrium price as a function
of ¹; described in the next section.
18heterogeneity leads to higher equilibrium prices (see for example Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse,
1992, ch. 6) because ¯rms have more market power if consumers have more intense preferences for
particular products. This is not necessarily true in our spatially extended model. It can be shown
for n > 2 that ±p¤=±¹ < 0 for ¹ small enough and ±p¤=±¹ > 0 for ¹ large enough.15 However,
±p¤=±¹ < 0 for n = 2. A typical pattern of the equilibrium price as a function of ¹ is represented
in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Equilibrium price, n = 4; t = 1; ® = 0:
The intriguing result is that competition can become tougher when products become more dif-
ferentiated. The intuition for this result should (and does) rely on the spatial structure of the
model. If ¹ is small, ¯rms behave as in the pure spatial model and each ¯rm competes mainly with
its immediate neighbors. All the action takes place at the frontier between the (almost perfectly
delineated) market areas. Firms compete primarily for the \undecided" consumers located halfway
between each pair of adjacent ¯rms. As ¹ rises, consumers start to entertain new possibilities (new
cafes for the right beer or cocktail, or the perfect environment). Competition is more intense as a
result: a cafe can more easily attract customers from the other side of town by slightly cutting its
price because some customers there really like this cafe. When ¹ rises more, the standard e®ect
dominates and price competition is relaxed. This intuition does not apply if n = 2 because each
¯rm competes directly with all its rivals (only one ¯rm here) even when ¹ = 0:
In summary, as ¹ rises from zero, market boundaries become blurred and each ¯rm ¯nds rivals
encroaching in its previously protected spatial market. As the barriers of spatial separation crumble,
prices fall both to retain customers and to attract customers from farther a¯eld. At the same time,
15Figure 1 is drawn for ¹ = 0:08293, which corresponds to the bottom of the price dip for n = 4 and t = 1:
19increasing ¹ creates greater brand loyalty in the nonspatial dimension, which tends to increase
equilibrium prices. For large enough ¹ the latter e®ect comes to dominate. It is instructive to
compare these results for those for a decrease in t (see the preceding section). For a decrease in
t, customers tend to travel further and it is easier to sway a customer from a rival ¯rm, leading
to more e®ective competition and lower prices. An increase in ¹ also induces customers to travel
further (and so they are more susceptible to capture), but (ceteris paribus) it becomes less easy to
sway a customer from a rival since they become less price sensitive. The impact of the second e®ect
dominates when ¹ is large and consumers choose their idiosyncratic product with scant regard to
transport costs.
In the short run, ¯rm size rises with ¹ when it is small (if and only if n > 2)) and decreases if it
is large enough. The index of e®ective variety Á, unambiguously rises in the short run: competition
becomes more global. Now consider the long run. In the ¯rst case (±p¤=±¹ < 0), pro¯t decreases
with ¹, and some ¯rms will leave. This situation is similar to a reduction in the transport cost rate
discussed in the previous section, and results in fewer and larger ¯rms selling at lower prices. The
change in the index Á is more intricate in this case. Products are more di®erentiated, but there are
fewer ¯rms. This leaves open the possibility that e®ective variety may fall with greater taste for
variety in the long-run.
If ¹ is large enough that ±p¤=±¹ > 0, ¯rm pro¯ts increase and the number of ¯rms increases
as well. Entry will contribute to decrease the price level somewhat (but not as low as before the
change in ¹):16 Therefore a rise in ¹ will in this case increase the price level and decrease ¯rm size
in the long run. The index Á will increase for two reasons: greater appreciation of variety and more
16Since there are more ¯rms, prices must be higher to support them.
20varieties provided. Competition is much more global as a result.17
One should not infer that the taste for variety has increased from the observation that there
are more ¯rms. Indeed, even if we are not in the perverse part of the parameter range, there are
other reasons for increases in the number of ¯rms. An obvious one treated in the next section is
that population has risen.
8. POPULATION GROWTH
One cannot ignore the explosive population growth in the world and especially in its cities. One
would expect that this would lead to more and larger ¯rms. This is indeed true in our model. The
mechanism is as follows. In the short run, price is independent of population, N, since replicating
consumers simply adds demand curves horizontally. Firm size rises proportionally to the consumer
population, as do gross pro¯ts. In the long run, more ¯rms enter, driving down prices, but the
increase in the number of ¯rms is less than proportional to the population increase. (The population
increase would support a proportional increase in the number of ¯rms if prices did not fall with n.
The increase in competition explains the result.) Output per ¯rm rises because price falls, using the
equality of ¯xed cost to ¯rm revenue at the zero-pro¯t equilibrium. Our index of e®ective variety,
Á, rises as population grows because there is more choice. There are more things to do in denser
cities because the larger population supports more \blocks" of ¯xed cost. In a similar vein, this is
one of the main sources of gains from trade when products are di®erentiated.
In the analysis above, population was increased without any concurrent rise in the geographical
17Another comparative static result of interest corresponds to increasing both ¹ and t in equal proportions. This
increases total product di®erentiation, while leaving the \mix" between global and local di®erentiation unchanged.
In the short run, Á is una®ected by such a change, so the only thing that happens (see (14)) is that price rises
proportionately. In the long run ¯rms enter and are smaller, and e®ective variety rises.
21size of the city. To account for area di®erences as well as population di®erences, let L rise the same
percentage amount as N so the density does not change as the city size increases. The short run
gives higher prices (since this is equivalent to a rise in t and a rise in N). More ¯rms enter, but
in a lower proportion to the rise in L and N. To see this, suppose that the city doubled (but kept
the same density). Then 2n ¯rms would make negative pro¯ts because ¯rms face more competition
which drives prices down.18 Thus prices are lower, and ¯rms are larger both because of the price
e®ect and because the number of consumers has risen more than the number of ¯rms. The impact
on Á is rather interesting. Since L=n rises, Á falls, suggesting that larger cities actually may have
less e®ective variety. This is so because competition is more intense, ceteris paribus, in large cities,
so the market supports fewer (but larger) stores per consumer. An important caveat is that larger
cities are more likely to have larger population densities, and, as we have seen for the reasons on
N alone, this e®ect per se increases e®ective variety. In the Salop model, increasing city size as
above merely replicates the initial structure. A city that is twice as large (with the same consumer
density) has twice the number of ¯rms. There is no diversity e®ect.
9. COST CHANGES
It is more di±cult to take a stand on how costs have changed over the years. If cottage industries
give way to mass production, the degree of increasing returns to scale rises. We capture this by
supposing ¯xed costs, K, rise, and average variable costs fall. Let us ¯rst treat the rise in ¯xed
costs in isolation (for example, store rents rise in city). Clearly nothing happens in the short run,
except that ¯rms make losses. Some exit, and prices rise in the long run. The e®ects on ¯rm size
18When ¹ = 0 (Salop's circle case) there is no such price e®ect, so increasing size simply increases ¯rm numbers
proportionately.
22are ambiguous, as noted in Section 5. The more surprising case is that ¯rms can actually shrink as
others exit the industry. This can happen if aggregate demand is su±ciently elastic, and is more
likely when demand is local. Exiting ¯rms cause price to rise, and the price rise is greater when
competition is mainly local because ¯rms have more local market power when rivals leave. The
price rise can be so large that it o®sets the larger market share e®ect of exit. High rent areas may
have small shops not only because shops economize on rent payments by having a small surface
area, but also because the low level of competition leads to high prices and low demand.
Marginal production costs can be introduced into the model in several ways. The easiest one is
to simply reinterpret the parameter ® as the elasticity of conditional demand with respect to the
markup. That is, let ® = ¡x0(p)[p ¡ c]=x(p), or indeed, x(p) = (p ¡ c)¡®. The analysis so far is
unchanged, except prices are interpreted as equilibrium mark-ups. This approach is rather ad-hoc.
It also does not yield the CES as a special case, and one of our objectives is to integrate the major
models of product di®erentiation. A slightly di®erent assumption does yield the CES as a limit
case. Suppose ® ´ ¡x0(p)p=x(p) as before, with v(p) =
1¡p
1¡®
1¡® and ® 2 [0;1), and let c > 0 be
marginal production cost. The CES model is given as the limit case ® ! 1 (so v(p) = ¡ln p) and

















; i = 1:::n; (18)
where Si is given by (8).19
19This demand system can also be derived from a representative consumer endowed with the aggregate income and
CES preferences






1=½ + x0; (9.1)
where ½ ´
1
1+¹ and x0 is consumption of the numeraire. See Anderson et al. (1992) for a similar derivation of an
23Returning to the general case corresponding to Section 4 with positive marginal cost, ¯rm i's
pro¯t is now written as ¦i = N(pi ¡ c)x(pi)Si ¡ K, so the candidate symmetric equilibrium price
(given n) is now the implicit solution to:
G(p) ´ ¡p
1¡®
(p ¡ c)S0n +p(1 ¡ ®) + ®c = 0; (19)
where the expression for S0 is the same as in Section 2. The solution, p¤ > c, is unique since G is
continuous in p and G0 < 0 when G(p) = 0:20 Anything that raises S0n decreases p¤. In particular,
the earlier comparative static results hold (recall that S0n = 1=Ã(n)): The only result that does
not hold is the ambiguity of ¯rm size with respect to entry (see Section 5). In the present version,
fewer ¯rms (due to an increase in K say) lead to larger ¯rm size for both localized and global
competition. This suggests the model is sensitive to the way in which marginal costs are added.
The e®ects of lower marginal cost are straightforward. From (19), price falls (so ¯rm size
increases) and the mark-up rises in the short run. Firms enter, and the long-run equilibrium
therefore involves lower prices and larger ¯rms (and hence lower mark-ups). Taking these results in
conjunction with the results for increased ¯xed costs, the adoption of technologies with increased
returns to scale leads to larger ¯rms. The e®ects on price and ¯rm numbers are ambiguous, but a
su±cient condition for price to fall is that the number of ¯rms does not fall.
alternative CES form.
20Di®erentiating (19) yields G
0 = (1 ¡ ®) ¡ S
0n((2 ¡ ®)p
1¡®
¡ (1 ¡ ®)cp
¡®
). Evaluating at G(p) = 0 gives
G
0(p
¤) = (1 ¡ ®) ¡
[p(1¡®)+®c][(2¡®)p¡(1¡®)c]
(p¡c)p which has the sign of ®(1 ¡ ®)k2 ¡ ®(3 ¡ 2®)k ¡ (1 ¡ ®)2, where
k ´ c=p 2 (0;1). This latter expression is convex, and negative at k = 0. At k = 1 it is also negative and is therefore
negative throughout.
2410. CONCLUSIONS
The approach presented in this paper provides a synthesis of major existing models of product
di®erentiation. Special cases yield the CES, the logit, the circle model, and a circle model with
price sensitive demand. The integrative framework enables us to link models that are rooted in
very di®erent primitives on consumer behavior (e:g. representative consumer and spatial models).
The bene¯t of the integrative framework is that it allows us to address issues that cannot
be properly formulated otherwise. For instance, the standard circle model does not admit non-
spatial product di®erentiation, so it cannot be used to tell us what happens when consumer taste
for variety rises. Likewise, the CES model is not appropriate for analyzing reductions in transport
costs. Realistically, both spatial location and product di®erentiation interact in determining market
structure. The interaction between the two is fundamental, and not simply the sum of the two
components. For example, higher taste for variety raises price when there is no geographical
di®erentiation (t = 0), but may decrease it when t is positive.
Although the model is strictly one of shopping behavior (but note that it applies equally well
to industrial location for ® = 0), it is tempting to interpret the qualitative results in terms of the
evolution of industrial structure. The main changes over the past two hundred years are a huge
reduction in transport costs, an increase in consumer taste for diversity, population growth, and
adoption of production techniques with greater returns-to-scale. That is, a drop in t, increase in
¹, increase in N, rise in K, and fall in c. Over the same period, industrial structure has changed
from many small-scale producers (a brewer in every town) and low e®ective product variety to few
large-scale producers with low real prices, and a large e®ective variety. That is, a decrease in n,
increase in NPx, fall in p¤, and increase in Á:
25These changes are clearly related, although several of what we treat as exogenous changes work
in opposite directions to the changes in the endogenous variables. What this means in e®ect is
that some e®ects outweigh the others. For example, if the number of ¯rms is observed to fall,
this should be because the population growth e®ect is outweighed by the increasing returns e®ect
(higher K), and lower transport costs outweigh any e®ect from increased preference for variety.
It is worth noting recent developments in the brewing industry: the advent of micro-breweries in
North America, and the revitalization of small breweries in the UK (following the Campaign for
Real Ale in the 1970's). This is what is expected from more taste for product variety (higher ¹).
Fixed number of Firms Long Run
Firm size Price Pro¯t Á n Firm size Price Á
n " ? ¡ ¡ + Not applicable
t # + ¡ ¡ + ¡ + ¡ +
¹ " ¹ low + ¡ ¡ + ¡ + ¡ ?
¹ " ¹ high ¡ + + + + ¡ + +
N " + 0 + + + + + +
% N " = % L " + + + ¡ + + ¡ ¡
c # + ¡ + 0 + + ¡ +
K " 0 0 ¡ 0 ¡ ? + ¡
The comparative static properties of the model are summarized in the table above. The ¯rst entry
is an increase in the number of ¯rms (n "), and is useful in understanding the long-run results
that follow. The next e®ects considered loosely follow the major changes in fundamentals. These
are lower transport cost (t #), larger taste for variety (¹ "), larger population size (N "), and an
increase in the geographical market size proportional to the population increase (%N " = % L ").
26Finally, the cost changes we consider are a lower marginal cost (c #) and a higher ¯xed cost (K ").
It would be interesting to calibrate the model to simulate either a study of an industry over
time, or else to undertake a comparison across di®erent industries. Empirical work would be most
welcome in evaluating the size of the various e®ects. In its present symmetric state, the model is
unlikely to be directly appropriate for speci¯c industry studies. There are several straightforward
ways to introduce asymmetries into the model. First one could use a linear market segment instead
of the circle if analyzing a pure characteristics model; for a geographic model of ¯rm location a
two-dimensional space is appropriate. The symmetry of locations could also be relaxed. Further
asymmetries can be introduced using quality variables for products. Finally, where multiproduct
¯rms are important, let us note that Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992) have formulated a
multiproduct ¯rm model based on the nested logit that could prove useful in applications.
One criticism of the model is the zero-pro¯t assumption used to characterize long-run equilib-
rium. The insight of Eaton and Lipsey (1978) was that pure pro¯ts may be earned when space
matters because a new entrant must ¯t into a niche between existing ¯rms. Their argument sug-
gests that the potential for pure pro¯t should be greatest when the structure of di®erentiation is
completely local. We tested this conjecture in Anderson and de Palma (1995). We showed that the
amount of pro¯t that can be shielded from entry is ¯rst increasing with product taste diversity (¹)
and then decreasing. The initial counterintuitive result is due to the behavior of the equilibrium
price for low values of ¹ (see Section 7): it becomes easier to keep entrants out as ¹ rises at ¯rst
because price falls. One would like to check out these types of questions more generally.
Finally, the model provides a sparsely parameterized version of a Chamberlinian setting, but
with oligopoly rather than monopolistic competition. (That is, n is not necessarily in¯nite.) As the
27intuitive description of the comparative static properties in the paper makes clear, the properties
are more general than our particular parameterization. We hope that this description will be useful
both in Industrial Organization and in Economic Geography.
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30APPENDIX 1. Proof of equilibrium existence and uniqueness for the circle model
with price-sensitive individual demands.
We ¯rst consider prices such that no ¯rm is undercut. Using (1), the consumer ^ z 2 (zi;zi+1)













so d^ z=dpi = ¡p
¡®
i =2t. Similarly, let ¹ z 2 (zi¡1;zi) be the consumer indi®erent between i and i ¡ 1,
with d¹ z=dpi = ¡d^ z=dpi. Firm i's pro¯t is ¦i = Np
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Select the lowest price ¯rm. Then the LHS of (A1.3) is non-negative, but the RHS is non-
positive. The only equilibrium candidate is thus the symmetric one.
To prove this is an equilibrium we ¯rst show pro¯t is quasiconcave for prices such that i does





























so the pro¯t function is necessarily strictly concave whenever @¦i=@pi = 0 and is hence strictly
quasiconcave.










tuting p¤ = [
(1¡®)tL
n ]1=(1¡®) shows undercutting requires a non-positive price and is therefore not
worthwhile. Q.E.D.
APPENDIX 2. Proof of equilibrium existence for the integrative approach, Á ¸ 1=3 .
Consider the point-pro¯t function (of ¯rm 0), ¼0(p0;p¤;z) = p
1¡®
0 P0(p0;p¤;z), which is the pro¯t
earned at point z when ¯rm 0 sets price p0 and all other ¯rms set equal prices, p¤, as given by (10).
Following the method outlined at the beginning of Section 4, we can write, for z 2 [k-;(k + 1)-];
P0(p0;p¤;z) = exp¢
½












where ¢ ´ [v(p0)¡v(p¤)]=¹ = [p¤1¡®
¡p
1¡®
0 ]=¹(1¡®). Clearly ¢ = 0 corresponds to the symmetric
candidate, and P0 (¢) then reduces to (11). Note that P0 (¢) is decreasing in z:





and ~ v¤ ´
p¤1¡®
1¡® , so that it su±ces to show that ¦0 ´ 2
R L=2
0 ¦0(~ v0;~ v¤;z)dz is quasiconcave in v0
given all other ¯rms have \utility" levels ~ v¤:
We now show that ¦0(~ v0;~ v¤;z) is quasiconcave in ~ v0, with maximum at ~ vM
0 and with a single
in°ection point at ~ vI
0(z) > ~ vM
0 (z), so that ¦0 (¢) is concave for ~ v0 · ~ vI
0(z) and is decreasing for
32~ v0 ¸ ~ vI
0(z). First note that
@¦0
@~ v0
= (1 ¡ ®)P0 + ~ v0(1 ¡ ®)P0(P0 ¡ 1)=¹
so that ~ vM
0 (z) is the unique solution to ~ v0 = ¹=(1 ¡ P0) (the LHS is increasing in ~ v0 whereas the
RHS is decreasing in ~ v0). Note that ~ vM
0 (z) is decreasing in z since P0 (¢) decreases with z. Likewise,





0 = 0, or ~ v0 = ¹=(1
2 ¡ P0), and again
~ vI
0(z) decreases with z:
Hence if ¦0(~ v0;~ v¤;0) is maximized at ~ vM
0 (0) · ~ vI
0(L=2) then ¦0(~ v0;~ v¤;z) is concave for all z
for ~ v0 · ~ vM
0 (0) and ¦0(~ v0;~ v¤;z) is decreasing for all ~ v0 ¸ ~ vM
0 (0) so that ¦0(~ v0;~ v¤) is concave for
~ v0 · ~ vM
0 (0) and decreasing for ~ v0 ¸ ~ vM
0 (0) and is thus quasiconcave in ~ v0. Figure 3 illustrates.
Note that if these conditions hold then ~ vM
0 (L
2) < ~ v¤ < ~ vM
0 (0).
Insert Figure 3
We therefore need a su±cient condition for ~ vM
0 (0) · ~ vI
0(L=2). From the de¯nitions of ~ vM
0 (0) and
~ vI
0(L=2), it su±ces that ¹=(1¡P0(~ vM
0 (0);~ v¤;0) · ¹(1
2 ¡P0(~ vI
0(L




2);~ v¤;L=2) · 1=2. Now, note that ~ vM
0 (0) must exceed ~ v¤ even if the candidate equilibrium
~ v¤ were in fact a pro¯t minimum or a pro¯t in°ection point. This is because ¦0(~ v0;~ v¤) is strictly
decreasing beyond ~ vM
0 (0) since ¦0 is falling for all z. It is therefore su±cient to prove that (i)
¹
1 ¡P0(~ v¤;~ v¤;0)
·
¹






1=2 ¡ P0(~ v0;~ v¤;L=2)
¡
¹
1 ¡P0(~ v0;~ v¤;0)
¶
¸ 0
for ~ v0 ¸ ~ v¤ (see Figure 4).
Insert Figure 4
To prove (i) it su±ces to prove that P0(~ v¤;~ v¤;0) ¡ P0(~ v¤;~ v¤;L=2) · 1=2; when that holds, it
su±ces to prove (ii) that @
@~ v0[P0(~ v0;~ v¤;0) ¡ P0(~ v0;~ v¤;L=2)] · 0 for ~ v0 ¸ ~ v¤. Now, P0(~ v¤;~ v¤;0) =
(1¡Á)=(1¡Ám)(1+Á) and P0(~ v¤;~ v¤;L=2) = (1¡Á)=(Á¡m¡1)(1+Á), so that condition (i) becomes





(1 + Á) ¡ 1 and µL=2 ´
(Á¡m¡1)
1¡Á (1 + Á) ¡ 1,









d~ v0 = sgn
£
µL=2µ0 ¡ exp 2¢
¤











Ám + Á¡m ¡ 2
¢¾
¸ exp 2~ ¢:
Since ~ ¢ · 0 in the region under consideration, it su±ces to show that the bracketed term is
nonnegative. This is true because the term has the sign of Ám +Á
1¡m
¡Á¡1, which is convex for
Á 2 [0;1] with zero derivative at Á = 1 (where it is zero).
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